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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HELEN S. BROADBENT, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee/ : 
vs. : 
ROSS BROADBENT, J 
Defendant/Appellant• 
: Court of Appeals 
: No. 930455-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in determining as a matter of 
law that the Settlement Agreement entered into between the 
parties was not enforceable as it was not supported by 
"legitimate" consideration? Conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness without any special deference. Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1. v. Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
2. Did the trial court err in determining as a matter of 
law that the Settlement Agreement entered into between the 
parties was not enforceable as it was not reduced to a final 
order of the court? Conclusions of law are reviewed for 
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correctness without any special deference. Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1. v. Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
3. Did the trial court err in determining as a matter of 
law that Defendant was not entitled to a credit against his 
obligations under the Decree of Divorce for the benefits actually 
received by Plaintiff pursuant to the Settlement Agreement 
entered into between the parties? Conclusions of law are 
reviewed for correctness without any special deference. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 
(Utah 1987). 
4. Did the trial court deny Defendant due process by not 
granting Defendant an evidentiary hearing on the benefits 
received by Plaintiff under the terms of the Settlement Agreement 
entered into between the parties? Conclusions of law are 
reviewed for correctness without any special deference. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 
(Utah 1987). 
5. Did the trial court err in determining the amount of 
"unpaid expenses,N "health insurance premiums," and "life 
insurance premiums" owed to Plaintiff by Defendant under the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce? Findings of fact shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, due regard being given to the 
trial court to weigh the credibility of witnesses. Findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous if they are without adequate 
evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous 
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view of the law. Western Capital & Sec. Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 
P. 2d 989 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 779 P. 2d 688 (Utah 1989). 
6. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in awarding 
Plaintiff prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent on 
child support and alimony arrearage as well as amounts claimed by 
Plaintiff for reimbursement from the date each such expense was 
initially paid by Plaintiff? Conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness without any special deference. Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1. v. Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
7. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in awarding 
Plaintiff her attorney's fees and costs in that Plaintiff failed 
to present any evidence regarding such during trial and failed to 
preserve her claim prior to the close of her case? Conclusions 
of law are reviewed for correctness without any special 
deference. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1. v. 
Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
8. Did the trial court err in finding that Plaintiff's 
costs and attorney's fees were reasonable in amount and that 
Plaintiff is not in a position to pay for her costs and 
attorney's fees? Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, due regard being given to the trial court to 
weigh the credibility of witnesses. Findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous if they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or 
if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law. Western 
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Capital & Sec. Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, 
property, debts or obligations, and 
parties . . . . 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the support and maintenance of the parties, 
the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property 
and obligations for debts as is reasonable 
and necessary . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case deals with (i) collection actions taken by 
Plaintiff Helen Schumann Broadbent ("Ms. Broadbent") for judgment 
amounts and alleged arrearages in the payment by Defendant Ross 
Broadbent ("Mr. Broadbent") of alimony, child support and other 
amounts due under the Decree of Divorce; (ii) whether an 
agreement entered into by the parties is enforceable and either 
totally or partially satisfied Mr. Broadbentfs past and future 
obligations for alimony, child support and other amounts due 
under the Decree of Divorce; (iii) whether the trial court 
correctly determined the amount of arrearages, including an award 
of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and (iv) whether an 
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award of attorney's fees and costs to Ms. Broadbent was 
appropriate in this action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
1. On May 7, 1986, the Court entered the Decree of Divorce 
in this case. R. 22-26. A photocopy of the Decree of Divorce is 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit "A." The Decree of Divorce 
provided, in relevant part, the following: 
a. That Mr. Broadbent pay child support in the amount 
of $100.00, $200.00 and $300.00 in March, April and May 1986, 
respectively, and $400.00 in June 1986 and monthly thereafter. 
Paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce. 
b. That Mr. Broadbent provide "standard health 
insurance" for the benefit of the parties' minor child. 
Paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce. 
c. That Mr. Broadbent maintain a life insurance 
policy on his life for the benefit of the parties' minor child in 
the face amount of $75,000.00. Paragraph 3 of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
d. That Mr. Broadbent pay two-thirds of any uninsured 
dental and medical care expenses for the parties' minor child. 
Paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce. 
e. That Mr. Broadbent pay one-half of the "lessons" 
and "summer school" costs of the parties' minor child. Paragraph 
5 of the Decree of Divorce. 
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f. That Mr. Broadbent pay alimony to Ms. Broadbent in 
the amount of $300.00 per month for a period of three years 
commencing July 30, 1986. Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce. 
2. On May 12, 1987, the trial court entered a Judgment 
against Mr. Broadbent in favor of Ms. Broadbent in the total 
amount of $7,196.50 representing arrearages for alimony and child 
support through February 28, 1987, and medical, dental and other 
costs incurred for the benefit of the parties1 minor child (the 
"1987 Judgment"). R. 45-46. A photocopy of the 1987 Judgment is 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit "B." 
3. On March 16, 1988, the parties entered into a Child 
Support and Alimony Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement 
Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement was filed with the Court 
on April 18, 1990. R. 49-50. Neither party was represented by 
counsel during the negotiation or drafting of the Settlement 
Agreement. A photocopy of the Settlement Agreement is included 
in the Addendum as Exhibit "C." The Settlement Agreement 
provided, in relevant part, the following: 
a. Mr. Broadbent would establish a vending machine 
business for Ms. Broadbent consisting of eighty vending machines 
to be delivered over a sixteen-month period. Ms. Broadbent would 
assume control, management and ownership of the vending machines 
as they were delivered to her. Paragraph l.A. and l.B of the 
Settlement Agreement. 
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b. Mr. Broadbent was to make arrangements on behalf 
of Ms. Broadbent for her to have direct access to wholesale 
suppliers for product, vending machine parts and insurance. 
Paragraph l.B of the Settlement Agreement. 
c. In the event Mr. Broadbent failed to deliver the 
machines as outlined over the sixteen-month period, the net 
income from the machines would be "credited directly toward [Mr.] 
Broadbentfs current legal obligation to [Ms. Broadbent and the 
parties' minor child]. Paragraph l.C of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
d. Upon Mr. Broadbentfs performance under the 
Settlement Agreement, Mr. Broadbent would receive "a full release 
from all past, present or future obligations relating to child 
support or alimony" and "all past obligations or judgments 
[would] be considered paid in full." Paragraph 1. and l.C of the 
Settlement Agreement. 
4. Mr. Broadbent transferred eighty vending machines to 
Ms. Broadbent within approximately the time frame set forth in 
the Settlement Agreement. R. 148-152. Mr. Broadbent was 
precluded by the trial court from presenting any evidence with 
respect to his performance under the Settlement Agreement. R. 
1178-79. 
5. On September 29, 1992, Ms. Broadbent filed an 
Application for Writ of Garnishment. The Application related to 
the "Judgment against Defendant Ross Broadbent herein, dated May 
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12, 1987, in the principal amount of $7,196.50, with interest 
thereon at the statutory rate (12%) in the amount of $6,120.32 
(through October 12, 1992), totaling $13,316.82 (the remaining 
amount due on the judgment)." R. 58-59. On October 29, 1992, 
pursuant to the Application, the trial court issued a Writ of 
Garnishment. R. 82-85. 
6. On November 4, 1992, Mr. Broadbent objected to the 
issuance of the Writ of Garnishment by filing a Request for 
Hearing. In the Request for Hearing, Mr. Broadbent claimed that 
the Writ of Garnishment was issued improperly because the 
judgment had been satisfied in whole or in part through the 
Settlement Agreement and Mr. Broadbent's performance thereunder. 
R. 61-63. 
7. On November 23, 1992, the trial court heard Mr. 
Broadbentfs objection to the issuance of the Writ of Garnishment. 
R. 1168-1183. The trial court requested the parties to file 
written memoranda as to the enforceability of the Settlement 
Agreement. R. 1178-1179. The trial court stated: 
If I'm satisfied that the contract, after I read 
the memoranda, is legally enforceable and that it 
doesn't fail for lack of consideration as a 
matter of law . . . [then] I'll schedule the 
matter for an evidentiary hearing and you can put 
on whatever testimony is appropriate as to 
whether or not the agreement has been complied 
with. 
R. at 1179. 
8. On December 14, 1992, Ms. Broadbent filed an 
Application for Garnishment (Post-Judgment) claiming that a 
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judgment in the amount of $79,020.71 had been entered even though 
no such judgment existed. R. 157. The Application for 
Garnishment was not supported by an affidavit or bond. On 
December 14, 1992, pursuant to the Application, the trial court 
issued a Writ of Garnishment in the amount of $79,020.71. R. 
186-189. Mr. Broadbent filed a Request for Hearing objecting to 
the Writ of Garnishment. R. 206-209. 
9. On December 30, 1992, and without further evidence or 
a hearing, the trial court entered its Minute Entry and found 
that Mr. Broadbentfs objection to the issuance of the Writs of 
Garnishment was without merit on the grounds that the Settlement 
Agreement was "invalid and without any legitimate consideration" 
and that the "Settlement Agreement did not result in a court 
order, and this Court has not authorized the substitution of 
vending machines for child support, even if the parties otherwise 
legitimately agree[d]." R. 183-185. 
10. Over Mr. Broadbent's objections (R. 193-202), on 
January 14, 1993, the trial court entered its Order overruling 
Mr. Broadbentfs objection to the Writs of Garnishment and 
"augmenting" the 1987 Judgment by Ms. Broadbentfs collection 
costs, attorney's fees and interest resulting in a judgment in 
the amount of $15,865.09 through December 31, 1992 (the January 
1993 Order). R. 231-235. A photocopy of the January 1993 Order 
is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "D." 
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11. On January 25, 1993, Mr. Broadbent filed a Motion to 
Amend Judgment, Motion for New Trial, Motion for Relief from 
Judgment, Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce Judgment, 
Request for Waiver of Supersedeas Bond and Request for Hearing 
relative to the January 1993 Order. R. 277-281. 
12. At a hearing on January 25, 1993, the trial court set 
an evidentiary hearing for February 8, 1993, for the purpose of 
determining the amount, if any, owed by Mr. Broadbent to Ms. 
Broadbent under the Decree of Divorce. R. 317-332. 
13. The trial court held evidentiary hearings on February 
8, 1993 (R. 1184-1257) and March 8, 1993 (R. 1258-1416) but 
refused to hear evidence as to the benefit received by Ms. 
Broadbent under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. R. 1187-
1188. The parties were instructed to and filed closing arguments 
in writing. R. 353-382 and 383-402. 
14. On April 28, 1993, the trial court issued its 
Memorandum Decision. R. 501-510. A photocopy of the Memorandum 
Decision included in the Addendum as Exhibit "E." 
15. On May 5, 1993, Mr. Broadbent filed his Objection to 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Request for Hearing. R. 543-548. 
16. On June 18, 1993, the trial court heard oral argument 
on Mr. Broadbent's Objection to the proposed Findings/Conclusions 
and Order. R. 1417-1431 and 651. The trial court overruled Mr. 
Broadbent's Objection. 
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17. On Jui.e 28, 1993, the trial court entered its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Court (the "June 
1993 Order"). R. 697-706. A photocopy of the June 1993 Order is 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit "F." 
18. On June 28, 1993, the trial court entered a Judgment 
against Mr. Broadbent in favor of Ms. Broadbent in the amount of 
$102,367.27 (the "June 1993 Judgment"). R. 716-717. 
19. On July 9, 1993, Mr. Broadbent filed his Notice of 
Appeal from the January 1993 Order, as modified by the June 1993 
Order and the June 1993 Judgment. R. 770-772. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Settlement Agreement was based on "legitimate" 
consideration. The Settlement Agreement did not have to be 
reduced to an order of the court to be enforceable. To the 
extent the Settlement Agreement dealt with amounts due as 
alimony, it is clearly enforceable. To the extent the Settlement 
Agreement dealt with amounts due as child support, Mr. Broadbent 
should receive credit against his child support obligation for 
the benefit or value derived by Ms. Broadbent thereunder. The 
trial court denied Mr. Broadbent due process by not granting an 
evidentiary hearing on the benefit or value derived by Ms. 
Broadbent under the Settlement Agreement. 
The trial court erred in its "augmentation" of the 1987 
Judgment by compounding the judgment interest thereon and by 
awarding attorney's fees and costs as a "cost" of collection. 
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The trial court erred in numerous respects relative to the 
entry of the June 1993 Order and June 1993 Judgment. First, the 
trial court again augmented the 1987 Judgment with interest 
thereby compounding the interest. Second, the trial court 
awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent rather 
than ten percent. Third, the trial court awarded judgment to Ms. 
Broadbent for unpaid expenses, health insurance premiums and life 
insurance premiums. Such an award was, however, without adequate 
evidentiary basis or foundation. Finally, Ms. Broadbent 
introduced absolutely no evidence to support her claim for an 
award of attorney's fees and costs and, accordingly, failed to 
meet her burden in proving the elements for an award of such. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
IS AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT AS 
IT RELATES TO ALIMONY AND, AS 
IT RELATES TO CHILD SUPPORT, TO THE 
EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT OR VALUE DERIVED 
BY MS. BROADBENT 
The trial court determined that the Settlement Agreement was 
"invalid" on the grounds that it (i) was without any "legitimate" 
consideration and (ii) was not reduced to a court order. The 
trial court erred in both respects as the Settlement Agreement 
relates to alimony. 
A. Alimony 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged the right of former 
spouses to bargain, compromise and settle alimony obligations. 
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Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah 1977). An agreement 
between former spouses with respect to the performance of past or 
future obligations under a decree of divorce for alimony is 
binding, in the same manner as any other contract. Id. 
The Settlement Agreement itself, therefore, constituted 
"legitimate" consideration for the compromise, settlement and 
satisfaction of Mr. Broadbentfs alimony obligations under the 
Decree of Divorce. Mr. Broadbent was, however, precluded from 
ever presenting any evidence of his performance under the 
Settlement Agreement. Had the trial court received evidence 
relative to the Settlement Agreement, it would have determined 
that Mr. Broadbent did, in fact, perform his obligations 
thereunder. The Settlement Agreement is based on lawful, 
adequate and "legitimate" consideration. Ms. Broadbent has, in 
fact, been compensated twice; once, for the vending machines 
received and the income derived therefrom and a second time by 
the judgments that have been entered against Mr. Broadbent and 
now satisfied. 
The trial court also held the Settlement Agreement invalid 
on the grounds that it was not reduced to a court order. Such is 
not required, however, under Utah law. An agreement relative to 
a divorce proceeding must meet certain requirements to be 
enforceable. The agreement must be in writing, executed by the 
parties and filed with the court or read into the record. Brown 
v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In this case, each 
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of the three requirements was met and, therefore, the Settlement 
Agreement is enforceable. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding the Settlement 
Agreement "invalid" with respect to alimony, 
B. Child Support 
Child support obligations are treated differently than other 
obligations under Utah law. The child's right to support cannot 
be bartered away, estopped or defeated by the parties. See Baggs 
v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974); Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1981); French v. Johnson, 401 P.2d 315 (Utah 1965). 
Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that there may 
be circumstances where one party is estopped from collecting 
child support. See Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 
1974), "[T]here may be some circumstances under which there may 
arise an estoppel to collect money accrued under a divorce 
decree. . . ."; French v. Johnson, 401 P.2d 315, 316-317 (Utah 
1965) (wife may be estopped from enforcing child support 
payments). 
In Utah Dept. of Social Serv. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1995 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court recognized that an "in-kind" 
payment of child support could effectively provide to the obligee 
a substantial bonus in the value of child support otherwise 
required to be paid. In Adams, this Court affirmed the trial 
court's approval of a written support agreement relieving the 
obligor ex-husband from physically paying $200 per month in 
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court-ordered child support in exchange for the obligee ex-wife 
and the minor children of the parties living rent free in a home 
owned by the ex-husband and which home had a fair market rental 
value of $350 per month. 
The agreement in Adams is analogous to the agreement that 
Mr. and Ms. Broadbent attempted to effectuate. The Settlement 
Agreement was prepared without the assistance of counsel. The 
parties negotiated such in good faith. The parties are not 
lawyers and obviously did not understand that they could not 
enter into an agreement which "bartered away" child support. The 
parties included, however, a provision to the effect that in the 
event Mr. Broadbent did not fully perform under the Settlement 
Agreement or something else went awry, Mr. Broadbent would merely 
receive credit against his obligations under the Decree of 
Divorce for the benefit actually derived by Ms. Broadbent under 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Paragraph l.C. of the 
Settlement Agreement provides: 
In the event Ross Broadbent fails to keep the 
schedule shown above [referring to the delivery 
of vending machines], the net income from the 
placed machines (after candy costs, charity 
payment, management, repairs and travel 
expenses,) will be credited directly toward Ross 
Broadbentfs current legal obligation to Helen 
Schumann and Christian Broadbent. Once all 80 
machines have been placed in operation, Ross 
Broadbent will have no further child support or 
alimony and all past obligations or judgments 
will be considered paid in full. 
Mr. Broadbent now acknowledges that the parties are prohibited on 
public policy grounds from "bartering away" child support. The 
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first sentence of paragraph I.e. of the Settlement Agreement 
provides protection of the child support obligation. However, 
the trial court utterly refused to give any application or weight 
to that particular provision or to give Mr. Broadbent any credit 
for the benefit transferred to Ms. Broadbent for vending machines 
and the income derived therefrom. Although prohibited from 
introducing any evidence, Mr. Broadbent proffered that he did 
deliver 80 vending machines which Ms. Broadbent accepted, took 
possession and control of and from which she derived substantial 
financial benefit. R. 148 and 1176-1177. 
In the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Broadbent was not 
attempting to unilaterally avoid or walk away from his 
responsibility to support his ex-wife or his minor child. Rather 
he was attempting to provide a substituted means of payment of 
those obligations on potentially a prepaid basis, and potentially 
in a substantially greater amount. 
The failure of the trial court to conduct a full evidentiary 
hearing on the benefit derived by Ms. Broadbent, which amount 
should be credited against Mr. Broadbent's child support 
obligation, constitutes a denial of due process under the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, § 7 and under Amendment XIV of the 
Constitution of the United States. Christiansen v. Harris, 163 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945). 
Accordingly, to the extent the Settlement Agreement does not 
apply to Mr. Broadbent's child support obligations under the 
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Decree of Divorce, it should be strictly enforced. Lawful 
consideration was given by Mr. Broadbent. There was and is no 
requirement that the Settlement Agreement be memorialized in a 
court order. To the extent the Settlement Agreement dealt with 
Mr. Broadbent's child support obligations under the Decree of 
Divorce, it should be enforced to the extent that Mr. Broadbent 
receive credit against his child support obligation for the 
benefit actually derived by Ms. Broadbent for vending machines 
received and income derived therefrom. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
"AUGMENTATION" OF THE 1987 JUDGMENT 
On May 12, 1987, the trial court entered a judgment against 
Mr. Broadbent in favor of Ms. Broadbent in the total amount of 
$7,196.50 relative to arrearage for alimony and child support 
through February 28, 1987, and medical, dental and other costs 
incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor child (the "1987 
Judgment"). After ruling in its Minute Entry of December 30, 
1992, that the Settlement Agreement was "invalid," the trial 
court, in its January 1993 Order (i) overruled Mr. Broadbent's 
objection to the Writ of Garnishment that had been issued and 
(ii) "augment[ed] the amounts of such outstanding Judgments (sic) 
by [Ms. Broadbent's] costs of collection, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, making the total amount of the Judgment of May 
12, 1992 (sic-May 12, 1987), $15,865.09, including interest 
through December 31, 1992, plus an additional $5.19 each day 
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thereafter until paid." R. 234. On January 7, 1993, Mr. 
Broadbent filed an objection to the proposed form of the January 
1993 Order. R. 193-202. The trial court erred in its 
augmentation of the 1987 Judgment by way of the January 1993 
Order in several respects. 
First, the trial court augmented the 1987 judgment by 
accruing interest on it through December 31, 1992. The effect of 
the trial courtf s action 3 the compounding of interest on the 
1987 Judgment after December 31, 1992. Utah law does not permit 
the compounding of interest on a judgment. Estate Landscape and 
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., 793 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992). In that case, this Court 
stated: 
This rule against compound interest on judgments 
is consistent with the general judicial disfavor 
of interest on interest. It is also of long 
standing and forms part of the backdrop against 
which the Legislature has statutorily provided 
for interest on judgments. We see no compelling 
reason to alter this longstanding gloss on the 
judgment interest statute. We therefore decline 
the invitation to engraft onto the statute 
judicial discretion to allow compound interest 
and reverse as to the award of compound interest. 
Id. at 420. Accordingly, interest on the 1987 Judgment should be 
calculated and paid by Mr. Broadbent at the simple judgment 
interest rate on the principal amount of $7,196.50 from May 12, 
1987 until the date paid. 
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Second, assuming arguendo that the 1987 Judgment could be 
augmented by the amount of interest that accrued from May 12, 
1987, to December 31, 1992 (the date used in ir 3 of the January 
1993 Order), the amount was miscalculated by the trial court. The 
interest amount should be calculated as follows: 
1987 $ 551.27 ($7,196.50 X .12 X 233/365) 
1988 863.58 ($7,196.50 X .12 X 365/365) 
1989 863.58 
1990 863.58 
1991 863.58 
1992 863.58 
Total $4,869.17 
Ms. Broadbent and the trial court apparently calculated the 
interest from May 12, 1987 to December 31, 1992 as $6,467.39, 
computed as follows: 
$15,865.09 Amount of augmented judgment 
R. 234, V 3 of Order 
-7,196.50 Less original principal 
amount of judgment 
R. 232, V 3 
-2,201.20 Less attorney's fees award 
R.233, V 6 
$ 6,467.39 
The trial court improperly accrued interest by $1,598.22 
($6,467.39 - $4,869.17). 
Third, the trial court also improperly awarded "costs" in 
the form of attorney's fees and other expenses in the amount of 
$2,201.20 in the January 1993 Order. R. 233, 1f 6. On December 
17, 1992, counsel for Ms. Broadbent filed an Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees. R. 175-178. The Affidavit was ostensibly filed 
to support a claim for attorney's fees and costs relative to the 
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"collection of the subject Judgment." R. 176, ir 2. The 
Affidavit claims $2,080.50 as a reasonable attorney's fee and 
$120.70 for costs. R. 177, ir 3-5. The Affidavit does not detail 
the nature of the claimed costs. 
Mr. Broadbent readily admits that the trial court could have 
awarded Ms. Broadbent her "costs" pursuant to Rule 64D(t) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relative to a collection action. 
The term "costs" is not defined in the Rules. In reference to 
the term "costs" under Rule 54, the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that "the trial court can exercise reasonable discretion in 
regard to the allowance of costs" although "it has a duty to 
guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 770, 773-74 (Utah 1980). 
The generally accepted rule is that it [costs] 
means those fees which are required to be paid to 
the court and to witnesses, and for which the 
statutes authorize to be included in the 
j udgment. 
Id. at 774. 
There was no evidence before the trial court as of January 
14, 1993, to enable it to determine whether the $120.70 was for 
taxable costs, such as court fees or service fees, or for 
nontaxable costs, for such expenses as photocopies or exhibits. 
Accordingly, the $120.70 claim cannot be taxed as costs until the 
trial court determines the nature of the claimed costs. 
Similarly, it is clear under Utah law that attorney's fees can 
not be awarded absent a contractual or statutory provision. 
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Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). It was 
improper for the trial court to award $2,080.50 for attorney's 
fees in the form of costs. 
Ms. Broadbent may argue that within the context of a divorce 
action, the trial court has discretion to award her attorney's 
fees. At the time the trial court entered the January 1993 
Order, there was, however, no petition or motion before the trial 
court for an award of attorney's fees within the context of the 
divorce action. At that time, Ms. Broadbent was, procedurally, 
attempting to collect a judgment. This Court has stated that: 
A trial court has the power to award attorney 
fees in divorce proceedings, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989). The award must be 
based on evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse 
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees. 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). No 
evidence was before the trial court relative to any of the three 
factors required to support an award of attorney's fees. 
Additionally, the trial court made no finding relative to any of 
the three factors in the January 1993 Order. Accordingly, the 
award of attorney's fees and costs was improper. 
In summary, the trial court improperly augmented the 1987 
Judgment in the January 1993 Order by compounding interest and 
awarding attorney's fees and costs. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NUMEROUS 
RESPECTS RELATIVE TO THE ENTRY OF THE 
JUNE 1993 ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
On June 28, 1993, the trial court entered its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Court (the "June 1993 
Order"). On June 28, 1993, the trial court also entered a 
Judgment against Mr. Broadbent in the amount of $102,367.27 (the 
"June 1993 Judgment"). The trial court erred in numerous 
respects relative to the entry of the June 1993 Order and June 
1993 Judgment. 
A. The 1987 Judgment. In the June 1993 Order, the trial 
court again addressed the 1987 Judgment and its augmentation in 
the January 1993 Order. R. 698-9, 1f 1-4. The errors made by the 
trial court relative to the January 1993 Order were repeated in 
the June 1993 Order. Mr. Broadbentfs argument with respect 
thereto are addressed in the previous section of this brief. 
B. Alimony. The trial court found that Ms. Broadbent was 
entitled to a judgment for unpaid alimony in the amount of 
$8,035.00, together with prejudgment interest at the rate of 
twelve percent. R. 699, 1f 7. Mr. Broadbent does not appeal the 
amount of the judgment. Neither does he appeal the finding that 
prejudgment interest is appropriate because under Utah law 
prejudgment interest is permitted if the judgment amount is fixed 
as of a particular date and can be determined with mathematical 
accuracy. Baker v. Dataphase, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 724 (D. Utah 
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1992). The appropriate prejudgment interest rate is, however, 
ten percent rather than twelve percent. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-
1(2) provides: 
Unless the parties to a lawful contract specify a 
different rate of interest, the legal rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per 
annum. 
Utah Code. Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (1992). Prejudgment interest is 
awarded at the contract rate of ten percent, not the judgment 
rate of twelve percent. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 
716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 
P.2d 105 (Utah 1986). 
C. Child Support. The trial court found that Ms. 
Broadbent was entitled to a judgment for unpaid child support in 
the amount of $25,065.00 through November 1992, together with 
prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent. R. 700, if 8. 
Again, Mr. Broadbent does not appeal the amount of the judgment 
or that prejudgment interest is appropriate. Mr. Broadbent does, 
however, submit that the contract rate of ten percent, not the 
judgment rate of twelve percent, is the appropriate rate for 
prejudgment interest. 
Mr. Broadbent submits that substantially all of the alimony 
and child support judgment amounts would have been considered 
paid had the trial court determined the amount of the benefit 
derived by Ms. Broadbent from the receipt of vending machines and 
the income derived therefrom. 
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D. Unpaid Expenses. The trial court next found that Ms. 
Broadbent was entitled to a judgment in the amount of $8,697.51 
through November 1992, together with prejudgment interest at the 
rate of twelve percent for "unpaid expenses." R. 700, 1f 9. 
Neither the amount of the judgment nor the award of prejudgment 
interest is appropriate. 
The amount of the judgment is evidenced by Exhibits 3, 5, 
and packets of checks in Exhibits 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, and 
allegedly by a number of checks which are in the exhibit packet 
contained in the record, but which were never received into 
evidence. Ms. Broadbent testified that these checks constituted 
the "backup documents" for Exhibits 3 and 5. R. 1194-5. 
The judgment amount for unpaid expenses in the amount of 
$8,697.51 was calculated by adding the amount of $5,197.51 shown 
on Exhibit 3 as "Addl. Expenses" to a claim of Ms. Broadbent for 
reimbursement of $3,500 relative to a garnishment of her accounts 
for a debt of Mr. Broadbent. Exhibit 5 is the detail of the 
information summarized on Exhibit 3. However, Exhibits 3 and 5 
are inconsistent by the amount of $867.57, calculated as follows: 
Exhibit Exhibit 
Year 3 5 
1987 748.83 427.23 
1988 918.63 382.61 
1989 512.18 512.14 
1990 1,030.98 1,030.95 
1991 886.88 887.03 
1992 1,100.01 1,089.98 
5,197.51 - 4,329.94 * $867.57 
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Ms. Broadbent introduced certain checks into evidence to 
support Exhibit 5. The checks are categorized by type of 
expenditure, as follows: 
Exhibit Category Amount 
27 Health Club and Seminar 605.00 
28 Vitamins 247.57 
29 Photos and clothes 475.05 
30 School Activity 544.89 
31 Skiing and Scouting 654.30 
32 Prescriptions 1,352.23 
Not received Miscellaneous 
The last batch of checks was never received as evidence in the 
case. As such they cannot be considered for any purpose. 
However, the checks are the only credible evidence upon which the 
trial court could have relied to determine whether Ms. 
Broadbent's reimbursement claim was appropriate. Exhibits 3 and 
5 are without adequate evidentiary foundation except as supported 
by checks representing actual payments made by Ms. Broadbent. 
As to Exhibit 27, the $605.00 amount claimed represents 
payments made to "Body Talk" and "Dynamic Relationship." At 
trial, Ms. Broadbent presented no evidence as to the purpose of 
these expenditures but claimed that they constituted "lessons" or 
"summer school" costs under paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce. 
It is clear, however, that they do not. No reimbursement by Mr. 
Broadbent is, therefore, required under the Decree of Divorce. 
As to Exhibit 28, Mr. Broadbent does not dispute the $247.57 
amount claimed as medical expenses for the benefit of the 
parties' minor child. 
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As to Exhibit 29, the checks indicate, and Ms. Broadbent 
readily admits, that the $475.05 amount represents claims for 
reimbursement of clothing and photograph expenses. However, no 
provision in the Decree of Divorce requires Mr. Broadbent to 
reimburse Ms. Broadbent for such expenses. The claimed 
reimbursement should have been denied in total by the trial 
court. 
As to Exhibit 30, attached hereto as Schedule A is listing 
of each individual check in Exhibit 30 by number, date, payee, 
purpose and amount. Mr. Broadbent is not liable for 
reimbursement to Ms. Broadbent for such items as books, flags, 
school pictures, flash card, overdue book fees, magazine 
subscriptions, crafts and clothing of the parties' minor child 
Christian. Mr. Broadbent acknowledges that he is liable for one-
half of the items noted on Schedule A with an asterisk in the 
total amount of $222.00. The balance of the claimed 
reimbursement should have been denied by the trial court as not 
constituting a lesson or summer school expense. 
As to Exhibit 31, the checks indicate and Ms. Broadbent 
again admits that the entire $654.30 amount claimed is for 
scouting activities and skiing. Again, no provision in the 
Decree of Divorce requires Mr. Broadbent to reimburse Ms. 
Broadbent for such expenditures. 
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As to Exhibit 32, Mr. Broadbent does not dispute that he is 
liable for two-thirds of such medical related expenses for 
Christian. 
As to the batch of checks which were not received into 
evidence, the trial court could not have considered them for any 
purpose. Even if the trial court were to consider them, Mr. 
Broadbent is not liable to reimburse Ms. Broadbent for a 
harmonica, art supplies, a baseball glove and grease pens. 
In a hearing subsequent to the issues addressed in this 
appeal, the trial court considered additional claims for 
reimbursement by Ms. Broadbent. See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt 
and Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Order entered 
February 28, 1994, included in the file in this matter (no record 
number was indicated by the district court clerk). In paragraphs 
19 through 29, the trial court held that it was inappropriate to 
permit reimbursement for such items as nonprescribed vitamins, 
art supplies, magazine subscriptions, truck maintenance and 
repair, pet food and pet expenses, bicycle expenses, photographs, 
football trips, impact training expenses, books, self-esteem 
training, etc., all of which Ms. Broadbent attempted to claim as 
reimbursable items. Either the trial court did not consider the 
purpose of the claimed expenditures or erred in permitting 
reimbursement for such expenses which are not subject to 
reimbursement under the Decree of Divorce. 
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In summary, Mr. Broadbent acknowledges the following claims 
for reimbursement. The trial court should have excluded the 
balance of claims for reimbursement as not being related to 
medical, lessons or summer school costs or for which no adequate 
evidentiary foundation was presented. 
Exhibit Total Mr. Broadbent's 
Amount Share 
27 0.00 0.00 
28 247.50 165.05 
29 0.00 0.00 
30 222.00 111.00 
31 0.00 0.00 
32 1,352.23 901.49 
TOTAL $1,177.54 
As to the claim for reimbursement of $3,500.00 relative to 
a garnishment, Ms. Broadbent testified that her savings and 
checking accounts were garnished by Key Bank pursuant to a 
judgment Key Bank secured against the Broadbents. R. 1210-1211, 
1213-1214. While Mr. Broadbent does not dispute that the 
obligation is his, the amount claimed of $3,500.00 is without any 
foundation and is totally based on hearsay evidence. R. 1213-
1214. As such, Ms. Broadbentfs claim for reimbursement should be 
rejected and denied. 
With respect to the claims for reimbursement discussed 
above, prejudgment interest is not appropriate because the date 
on which Ms. Broadbent made a request to Mr. Broadbent for 
reimbursement is not within the record. The date on which 
prejudgment interest began to accrue cannot be determined. 
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Accordingly, prejudgment interest is not appropriate for "unpaid 
expenses." 
E. Health Insurance Reimbursement. The trial court 
further found that Ms. Broadbent was entitled to a judgment of 
$6,900 for reimbursement of health insurance premiums she had 
paid, together with prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve 
percent. R. 700, if 10. Neither the amount of the judgment nor 
the award of prejudgment interest is appropriate. 
Ms. Broadbent testified that the claimed reimbursement for 
health insurance premiums for the benefit of the parties' minor 
child covered amounts paid through her employment. R. 1197-8, 
1204-1206. She testified that she calculated such amount by 
"going back to my companies, and asking what Christian's share 
was of that." R. 1206. Again this constitutes hearsay evidence. 
Ms. Broadbent did not produce or offer into evidence any 
documentation supporting the claimed premium cost. R. 1206. 
Ms. Broadbent claims that the premium cost for Christian's 
health insurance policy was exactly $100.00 per month and 
remained exactly that amount from March 1987 to December 1992, a 
period of almost six years. Such a claim is ludicrous given the 
spiraling cost of health insurance during that time period and 
also given the fact that Ms. Broadbent apparently had more than 
one employer and/or health insurance carrier, each of which 
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allegedly charged exactly $100.00 per month for the insurance 
coverage. 
The trial court erred by relying on such evidence which 
lacked any credibility whatsoever. Mr. Broadbent acknowledges 
his obligation to reimburse Ms. Broadbent for health insurance 
premiums paid if the amount can be substantiated. 
F. Life Insurance Reimbursement. The trial court next 
found that Ms. Broadbent was entitled to a judgment in the amount 
of $9,246.00 through November 1992 for life insurance premium 
reimbursement, together with prejudgment interest at the rate of 
twelve percent. R. 701, If 11. Neither the amount of the 
judgment nor the award of prejudgment interest is appropriate. 
Ms. Broadbent testified that she claimed reimbursement of 
the premium cost of life insurance she obtained on Mr. 
Broadbentfs life because he failed to do so. R. 1192, 1198-9. 
Ms. Broadbent did not present any exhibit at trial as to the 
amount of the premium. Ms. Broadbent contradicted herself as to 
the timing of the payment. At one point, Ms. Broadbent testified 
that she made a quarterly premium payment. R. 1199. At another 
time, Ms. Broadbent testified that the premium was withheld from 
her payroll checks. R. 1387.l 
1
 Ms. Broadbent claims that the premium cost of the life 
insurance policy was exactly $134.00 per month and remained 
exactly that amount from March 1987 to December 1992, a period of 
almost six years. The premium cost over a six year period on a 
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The trial court erred in awarding a judgment in the amount 
of $9,246.00 on such flimsy evidence. Mr. Broadbent acknowledges 
his obligation to reimburse Ms. Broadbent for life insurance 
premiums if the amount is accurately established and evidence of 
payment is provided. 
G. Attorney's Fees. 
The trial court awarded Ms. Broadbent $2,201.20 for costs of 
collection relative to the January 1993 Order and $4,145.00 
relative to the February and March hearings. R. 699, 1f 4 and R. 
701, V 11. 
There is no question that a trial court has discretion to 
award attorney's fees in a divorce action. Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-3 (Supp. 1993); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493-94 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). Where the award is based on need, the trial court 
must support the award with adequate findings, detailing the 
reasonableness of the amount awarded and the need of the 
receiving party. Finleyson v. Finleyson, 1994 WL 135241 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
In the Memorandum Decision of April 28, 1993, and in the 
Findings of Fact contained in the June 1993 Order, the trial 
court made no finding "detailing the reasonableness of the amount 
term policy must have changed in amount. If the policy was a 
whole life or universal life policy, which typically has a level 
premium, Mr. Broadbent was charged with the savings feature of 
the policy as well as the cost of the insurance coverage itself. 
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awarded and the need of the receiving party." In fact, the trial 
court would have been unable to do so because Ms. Broadbent 
presented no evidence on the issue of attorney's fees at the 
evidentiary hearing. In awarding attorney fees relative to the 
January 1993 Order as well as the June 1993 Order, the trial 
court apparently relied on Plaintiff's Closing Statement Brief 
(R. 353-382) which was the first claim Ms. Broadbent made for an 
award of attorney's fees. The award is clearly erroneous in that 
Mr. Broadbent had absolutely no opportunity to cross-examine Ms. 
Broadbent or her counsel on that issue and the fundamental legal 
requirements were not even remotely met. 
The trial court made only one vague reference in the 
Memorandum Decision of April 28, 1993, that Ms. Broadbent was 
"not in a position to pay the attorney's fees that she has 
incurred." R. 508. Again, there was absolutely no evidence by 
way of testimony or exhibit that focused on the issue of Ms. 
Broadbent's income or wealth. It was only an after-the-fact 
attempt by Ms. Broadbent in Plaintiff's Closing Statement Brief 
that the issue was first addressed. 
Based on the fact there is no evidentiary basis for a 
finding of the reasonableness of Ms. Broadbent's attorney's fees 
or of the need of Ms. Broadbent for assistance in paying those 
fees, the award of attorney's fees should be denied in total. 
32 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the January 1993 Order, the June 
1993 Order and the June 1993 Judgment should be reversed and 
remanded to the trial court for further evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this t'rfk day of May 1994. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
,Orv\ WJU./.lX^r) 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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On this /£fj day of May 1994, I hereby caused to be mailed 
via first-class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following: 
James L. Thompson, Esq, 
2470 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, Ut4h 84119 
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SCHEDULE A 
[SCHOOL 
Check # 
0165 
255 
283 
545 
608 
621 
646 
672 
750 
789 
915 
1005 
1301 
1344 
1350 
1356 
1560 
1642 
1876 
1914 
1915 
1953 
2024 
2175 
2183 
2233 
3007 
4110 
4154 
ACTIVITY 
Date 
9/15/87 
1/28/89 
2/16/89 
4/21/88 
9/7/89 
9/15/89 
9/2/89 
10/12/89 
8/22/89 
11/9/89 
1/3/90 
7/25/89 
8/22/90 
9/18/90 
9/25/90 
10/1/90 
2/11/91 
3/21/91 
8/10/91 
8/22/91 
8/22/91 
9/5/91 
10/7/91 
12/12/91 
12/20/91 
1/14/92 
3/17/92 
8/18/92 
9/9/92 
$ 5 4 4 . 8 9 ] 
Payee 
Eagle Aquatics 
Skaggs 
Troll Book Club 
Granite School Dist. 
Modern Display 
Life Touch Photography 
Olympus Jr. High 
Deseret Bookstore 
Olympus Jr. High 
Hart Bros. 
SL County Library 
Pic N Save 
Olympus Jr. High 
Valley West Office 
Olympus Jr. High 
Olympus Jr. High 
Perrys 
Olympus Jr. High 
Karen Marchant 
Olympus Jr. High 
Olympus Jr. High 
Olympus Jr. High 
Olympus Jr. High 
Olympus Jr. High 
Bonnie Nelson 
County Library 
Crestview Elementary 
Olympus High School 
Olympus High School 
Purpose 
Swimming 
Books 
Mill Hollow 
Flags 
School Pictures 
3 Magazines 
Books 
Fees 
Flash Cards 
Overdue Books 
School Supplies 
Registration 8th 
School 
Magazines 
(Sports 111. 
Newsweek) 
2 English Books 
School 
Shirt 
Christian's 
Registration 
Basic 
English 
Crafts 
Book Replacement 
Registration 
Spanish Workbooks 
Amount 
$22.00 
16.31 
5.70 
27.50 
10.57 
8.50 
43.87 
8.39 
43.00* 
3.95 
12.10 
17.23 
40.00* 
8.17 
50.88 
16.00 
6.28 
6.50 
8.00 
41.00* 
10.50 
5.10 
5.00 
4.77 
2.75 
7.40 
9.50 
98.00* 
6.00 
The sum of the amounts marked with an asterisk equals $222.00, of which Mr. 
Broadbent would be obligated to reimburse Ms. Broadbent the amount of $111.00 
